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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Doclcet No. 36466-2009 
SIRIUS LC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company, 
PlaintiffiRespondent, 
VS. 
BRYCE B. EFUCKSON, AND ANY PERSON CLAIMING UNDER, BY OR THROUGH 
BRYCE H. ERICKSON IN AND TO THE REAL PROPERTY DESCRIBED AS FOLLOWS: 
TOWNSHIP 5 SOUTH, RANGE 46 E.B.M., SECTION 27: LOTS 1 AND 
2, N%NW%, EXCEPT THEREFROM THE S%NEl/NWl/NWl/, 
RESPONDENT'S BHEF 
Appeal from the District Court of the Sixth Judicial District for Caribou County. 
Honorable Don L.Hardig i Mitchell  brow^, District Judge, Presiding. 
A. Bruce Larson, Esq. Bryan D. Smith, Esq. 
ABLE LAW PC B. J. Driscoll, Esq. 
Attorneys at Law Smith, Driscoll & Associates 
155 South 2nd Ave. P. 0 .  Box 50731 
P.O. Box 6369 414 Shoup Avenue 
Idaho Falls, Idaho 83405 
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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE. 
A. Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by Sirius LC ("Sirius"), a Wyoming Limited Liability 
Company, to enforce a Promissory Note (also "Note") and to foreclose a real estate Mortgage 
executed by Bryce H. Erickson ("Ericltson"). The Mortgage encumbered real property located in 
Caribou County, Idaho. Erickson admits that he executed the Promissory Note and that he also 
executed the Mortgage but denies that he is obligated to pay the amounts due and owing on the 
Promissory Note. The reasons for Erickson's refusal to pay are based upon the affirmative 
defenses raised by Erickson in his responsive pleadings. 
B. Course of Proceedings 1 Statement of Facts. 
1. Procedural Historv. 
Sirius LC, a Wyoming Limited Liability Company, filed a complaint to enforce a 
Promissory Note and to foreclose a real estate Mortgage. The Note and Mortgage were executed 
by Bryce H. Erickson on November 13, 1999. The Mortgage secured the Promissory Note and 
encumbered real property located in Caribou County, Idaho. 
The terms of the Promissory Note required that Erickson would pay Sirius $29,173.38 
together with interest at the rate of 10% per m u m .  Ericltson failed and refused to pay the 
Promissory Note which led to the action seeking foreclosure of the Mortgage. Erickson filed a 
on for s u n q  judgment challenging the validity of the Note and Mortgage. The motion 
ed Answer. The 
11. As a separate and further defense, Defendant alleges that there was 
inadequate and insufficient consideration to support the purported 
agreement between the parties. (emphasis added) 
Clerk's Transcript Sirius I (R. p. 24); Sirius v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 156 P.3d 539, 62 UCC 
The District court denied Erickson's Motion for Summary Judgment and alternatively 
granted Summary Judgment to Sirius. Erickson moved for reconsideration. At issue on 
reconsideration was the District Court's ruling and whether there were any genuine issues of 
material fact regarding Erickson's other affirmative defenses. Erickson did not file additional 
affidavits to establish material issues of fact in support of the other affirmative defenses, nor did 
Erickson submit any other factual information relating to his initial claim of failure of 
consideration. The Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Erickson filed an appeal, 
This Coud upheld the ruling of the District Court that there was consideration for the 
Promissory Note and Mortgage holding: 
"In this case, Erickson requested Bagley's representation in a Chapter 12 
proceeding. Bagley agreed to represent Erickson if he would sign a promissory 
note payable to Sirius, secured by a real estate mortgage. Erickson requested 
Bagley's representation for his own benefit and signed the promissory note at 
issue in anticipation of receiving such benefit. The record establishes that Bagley 
agreed to, and did, represent Erickson in his Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceeding, 
so Erickson received the benefit for which he bargained. Certainly, a party cannot 
execute a promissory note, let it default, and then escape the consequences of his 
promise by defending on the ground of lack of consideration after he has received 
the benefit of his bargain. See Daniels v. Englehart, 18 Idaho 548,551, 11 1 P. 3-4 
(1910) (the maker of a note cannot receive consideration, and at the same time 
successfully resist the payment of the obligation). Tl~us, the promissory note does 
not lack consideration because Bagley gave consideration for the note when he 
represent Erickson in ex 
UCC Rep.Serv.2d 41 1 (2007). 
However, this Court vacated the holding of the District Court relating to the other 
affirmative defenses raised by Defendant Erickson. The matter was remanded to the District 
Court for further proceedings relating to Erickson's affirmative defenses. The matter was tried 
before the District Court sitting without a jury on June 30 and July I, 2008. Following the trial, 
Sirius and Erickson each submitted additional arguments and authorities. The District Court 
entered judgment in lavor of Sirius on September 30,2008. Sirius timely filed a Memorandum of 
Costs and Attorney Fees. Erickson did not file an objection to the Memorandum of Costs and 
Attorney Fees. The attorney for Erickson agreed that Sirius was entitled to the award of costs and 
fees as the prevailing party and that the fees requested were reasonable. (Tr. Motion for 
Reconsideration p. 2, L 21-23). Erickson filed a Motion for Reconsideration, or in the 
Alternative, for New Trial. The Motion was denied and Ericlcson filed this appeal. 
2. Parties to the Action. 
Sirius LC is the Plaintiff in this action. Bryce Erickson is the Defendant. William 
Bagley ("Bagley") is not a party to the action. Bagley is a Wyoming attorney who represented 
Erickson and lus now ex-wife in Chapter 11 bankmptcy proceedings in Wyoming during their 
divorce proceedings in Wyoming. Erickson has made no attempt to join Bagley as a party or 
ask leave to allow a third-party complaint against Baglcy. Erickson has had a full and fair 
opportunity to litigate any issues involving Bagley's conduct in the Federal Bankruptcy Court in 
the state of Wyoming. However, Erickson has raised a number of affirmative defenses relating to 
Bagley's conduct during his representation of Ericltson in bankruptcy court in an attempt to 
avoid the foreclosure of a Promissory Note and Mortgage by Sirius. None of the affirmative 
defenses involve any conduct or acts on the part of Sirius. The affirmative defenses are all based 
Bagley's representation of Erickson took place before Erickson again solicited Bagley's legal 
representation for a later Chapter 12 bankruptcy action. 
The facts are undisputed that Bagley's legal representation of Erickson commenced 
sometime during the year 1998 and tenninated on June 6, 2000. All of the representation took 
place in the State of Wyoming. Erickson was at all material times a resident of the state of 
Wyoming. Ericlcson, subsequent to the termination of Bagley as his lawyer, filed a motion in the 
Chapter 12 bankruptcy case challenging the Promissory Note and the security of the Mortgage. 
The motion, entitled "Motion for Release of Mortgage to Secure Payment of Promissory Note to 
Sirius LC", contained many of the same factual allegations that were later used as a basis for the 
affirmative defenses now being pursued by Erickson in Ibis action. (P's Ex. 17). The Wyoming 
bankruptcy judge ruled that the relief requested in the motion was denied and that in order for 
Erickson to avoid the lien of the Mortgage it would be necessary to file an adversary proceeding 
in the Bankruptcy Court. The Wyoming bankruptcy Judge also held: "These minutes constitute 
the court's official order in this matter;" (P's Ex. 18). 
Erickson did not file the adversary proceeding in the Bankruptcy Court nor did he make 
any further challenge to the ruling of the Court which denied the relief he sought in the 
bankruptcy action. Judith A. Shively ("Shively"), a Wyoming bmkmptcy attorney, was retained 
by Erickson to represent him in the Wyoming Chapter 12 proceeding. Shively was also called as 
a1 "expert witness" and testified at the time of the trial in this matter. Shively testified that the 
issues regarding the effectiveness of Mr. Bagley's representation of Erickson or whether he 
committed malpractice could have been heard in the Wyoming Bankmptcy Court and, in fact, 
were "core" issues in the b 
3. Admitted Facts. 
Erickson stipulated that Sirius had proven its case. At the beginning of the trial in this 
matter, Erickson's attorney made several admissions and stipulations which conclusively 
established that Sirius had met its burden of proof as to all of the material allegations of the 
Complaint. Ericltson's attorney admitted and stipulated as follows: 
MR. SMITH: So it just seems to me, Your Honor, that they haveprevailed on 
their case because they have established as a matter of law the promissory note. 
They have established my client hasn't paid and it just seems to me, Your 
Honor, they have alreadyput on their case by virtue of that." (Emphasis added) 
(Tr. P 4, L 15-17). 
"Your I-Ionor, I am even willing to go farther given the ruling by the Supreme 
Court. I am willing to stipulate that they have proven their case and we are here to 
put on our affirmative defenses." 
(Tr. Vol. 1, pp. 5,6 L 2- 1-3). 
"MR. LARSON: Your Honor, we are prepared to go forward with Mr. Smith's 
idea. And as I understand it, they are admitting our case has been proven. They 
are admitting to the numbers in the promissory note. They are admitting that the 
mortgage is valid, the note is valid, and all of the other material issues that are ill 
our complaint. And would admit those have been found in our favor, except they 
have their affirmative defenses to go forward on. 
THE COURT: That is my understanding. Is that correct? 
MR. SMITH: That is correct, Your Honor. That is correct. He says they are valid. 
resolved by a Marital Property Settlement Agreement ('"Divorce Settlement"). ( P's Ex. 3). The 
Divorce Senlement specifically referred to fees owed to Mr. Bagley. The Divorce Setllement 
provided that Erickson would pay those fees. Erickson agreed in his testimony at trial that the 
issue concerning attorney fees was part of what was-reviewed by the independent attorney 
representing Ericlcson in the divorce. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 43, L 12-25). Erickson also testified that he 
understood that all of the information regarding debts was to be disclosed in the Divorce 
Settlement. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 42, L 17-25). Erickson admits in his testimony that he had a full 
understanding of the Note and Mortgage at the time that he executed the documents. Erickson 
testified that he was not complaining about what Mr. Bagley did for him i'n the Chapter 12 
banlmptcy proceeding. (Tr. Vol. 2, p. 50, L 1-25, p.5, L 11-21), 
4. Affirmative Defenses. 
Erickson's Amended Answer included thirteen affirmative defenses, for which he had the 
burden of proof on the elements of each. During the trial Erickson presented evidence that 
focused on Bagley's legal representation and the amount Bagley charged for his services during 
the Chapter 11 proceeding in Wyoming. Erickson used his affirmative defenses as a springboard 
to bringing what amounted to a third-party malpractice claim against Bagley in the Idaho District 
Court. 
11. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL. 
4. Did the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court have exclusive jurisdiction to determine the 
claims relating to William Bagley? 
5. Does the doctrine of "res,judicatan bas Bryce Erickson's claims against William 
Bagley? 
6. Does the doctrine of "judicial estoppel" bar Bryce Erickson's claims against 
William Bagley? 
7. Does the doctrine of "the law of the case" prevent Bryce Erickson from 
challenging the basis of consideration for the promissory note? 
8. Does the doctrine of "the law of the case" prevent Bryce Erickson from 
challenging the amout of the promissory note? 
9. Did the District Court err in allowing William Bagley to testify as an expert 
witness? 
10. Is Sirius entitled to the award of attorney fees in accordance with the terms of the 
parties agreement and pursuant to Idaho Code 512-120 (3)? 
111. ARGUMENT. 
A. Standard of Review. 
This Courl recently stated the following in the case of Borah v. McCandless, 147 Idaho 
Co., 119 Idaho 946,949,812 P.2d 253,256 (1991)). Since it is the province of the 
trial court to weigh conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility 
of witnesses, this Court will liberally construe the trial court's findings of fact in 
favor of the judgment entered. Rowley v. Fuhrman, 133 Idaho 105, 107, 982 P.2d 
940, 942 (1999). This Court will not set aside a trial court's findings of fact unless 
the findings are clearly erroneous. Ransom v. Topaz Mktg., L.P., 143 Idaho 641, 
643, 152 P.3d 2, 4 (2006); I.R.C.P. 52(a). If the trial court based its findings on 
substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, this Court will not 
overturn those findings on appeal. Benninger, 142 Idaho at 489, 129 P.3d at 1238. 
Additionally, this Court will not substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial 
court. Ransom, 143 Idaho at 643, 152 P.3d at 4. This Court exercises free review 
over matters of law. Bolger v. Lance, 137 Idaho 792, 794, 53 P.3d 1211, 1213 
(2002) (citing Bouten Constu. Co. v. HF. Magnuson CO., 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992 
P.2d 751, 755 (1999))." Borah, 205 P.3d 1209, 1214. "A trial court's findings of 
fact will not be set aside on appeal unless they are clearly erroneous. When 
deciding whether findings of fact are clearly erroneous, this Court does not 
substitute its view of the facts for that of the trial court." Thomas v. Madsen, 142 
Idaho 635, 637, 132 P.3d 392, 394 (2006), "It is the province of the trial court to 
determine ... the inferences to be drawn from the evidence." KMSI: LLC v. County 
ofilda, 138 Idaho 577,581,67 P.3d 56,60 (2003)" 
Bird v. Bidwell, 147 Idaho 350, 209 P.3d 647, 649, 650 (2009). The District Court properly 
exercised its descretion in the conduct of the case and trial. The District Judge ruled properly 
applied its findings to the legal principles that controled the action. 
Erickson. The facts are undisputed that the legal representation commenced sometime during the 
year 1998 and terminated on June 6, 2000. The representation took place in the State of 
Wyoming during the time that Erickson was a resident of that state. Erickson filed a motion in 
the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court challenging the Promissory Note and the security of the 
Mortgage. 
Idaho Code (j 5-5 14 provides: 
Acts subjecting persons to jurisdiction of courts of state.-- Any person, firm, 
company, association or corporation, whether or not a citizen or resident of this 
state, who in person or through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter 
enumerated, thereby submits said person, firm, company, association or 
corporation, and if an individual, his personal representative, to the jurisdiction of 
the courts of this state as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any of 
said acts ... 
(a) The transaction of any busiiiess within this state which is hereby defined 
as the doing of any act for the purpose of realizing pecuniary benefit or 
accomplishing or attempting to accomplish, transact or enhance the business 
purpose or objective or any part thereof of such person, firm, company, 
association or corporation. 
(h) The commission of a tortious act within this state; ..." 
This Court has held: "Implicit in a jurisdictional question such as this are two issues - 
whether the acts alleged fall within the acts enumerated by the statute, and whether the assertion 
of jurisdiction would violate the defendant's right to due process of law." Akichika v. Kelleher, 
96 Idaho 930, 539 P.2d 283 (1975). The court in Akichika determined that a transaction between 
e state of a Idaho to allow jurisdiction under the st 
he transact business within the state of Idaho. Erickson is not a resident of the state of Idaho. All 
of his dealings with Bagley took place in the state of Wyoming. Damages, if any, to Erickson 
would have occurred in the state of Wyoming. The legal representation and other acts claimed to 
have been committed by Bagley occurred within the state of Wyoming. The state of Idaho does 
not have subject matter jurisdiction or personal jurisdiction over Bagley. Erickson relies on his 
affirmative defenses as a basis to litigate a third-party claim against Bagley. Bagley was not 
served with process or joined as a party to the action, nor was he allowed an opportunity to 
respond to the allegations in the appropriate forum. 
The action of Sirius to foreclose a mortgage is equitable in nature and the plaintiff is riot 
entitled to a jury trial nor is the defendant who raises only affirmative defenses entitled to a jury 
trial. In Grausz v. Englander, 321 F.3d 467, (2003), the Court discussed ihe right to a jury trial in 
a lmnkruptcy proceeding holding that a case may be tried before a bankruptcy judge and a jury 
with the authorization of the district court and the consent of the parties. See 28 U.S.C. 5 157(e). 
In any event, an adversary proceeding may be transferred to the district court if a jury trial is 
required. See In ve Stansbury Poplar Place, Inc., 13 F.3d 122, 128-29 (4th Cir. 1993). 
The District Court was correct in its determination that Erickson was not entitled to 
ground his aKirmative defenses in Bagley's conduct during prior representation. Erickson had not 
challenged the status of Sirius as a separate entity. The claims against Bagley should have been 
properly pled as a third-party complaint which would require Erickson to serve process on 
, the state of Idaho does not h 
process nor did he have an o to respond as a party to all 
representation in a state of Wyoming. Erickson, by his admission that Sirius has proven its case, 
cannot challenge the legal status of Sirius as an independent entity. 
C. Law of the Case / Adequacy of Consideration. 
The issues relating to the determination of whether or not there was consideration for the 
Note and Mortgage have been determined by this Court. That determination estops Erickson 
from now arguing different reasons or presenting additional evidence oflack of consideration. 
The atlenlpt by the Defendant violates the 'law of the case' doctrine. The 'law of the case' 
doctrine provides that when "the Supreme Cow, in deciding a case presented states in its 
opinion a principle or rule of law necessary to the decision, such pronouncement becomes the 
law of the case, and must be adhered to throughout its subsequent progress, both in the trial court 
and upon subsequent appeal." Swanson v. Swanson, 134 Idaho 512,515,5 P.3d 973,976 (2000). 
As a matter of law, the issue of consideration has been determined in this case and the holding is 
clear. Sirius v. Erickson, 144 Idaho 38, 156 P.3d 539, 62 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 41 1 (2007). 
This Court, in its previous decision relating to this case, conclusively determined that 
there was consideration for the Pron~issory Note and Mortgage delivered by Erickson to Sirius. 
Erickson obtained the benefit of his bargain. The holding is tantamount to determining that the 
consideration is adequate, "A promise for a promise is adequate legal consideration to support a 
contract." Eastern Idaho Production Credit Association v. Placerton, Inc., 100 Idaho 863, 606 
P.2d 967 (1980); citing: Caldwell v. McKenna, 54 Idaho 552, 33 P.2d 366 (1934); Knack v. 




(a) a gain, advantage, or benefit to the promisor or a loss, disadvantage, or 
detriment to the promisee; or 
(b) equivalence in the values exchanged; or 
(c) 'mutuality of obligation.' " 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts 5 79, Adequacy of Consideration; Mutuality of 
Obligation 
"Comment c." following 5 79 clearly illustrates the concept of adequacy under 
circumstance on point with the facts of this case. 
c. Exchange of unequal values. To the extent that the apportionment of productive 
energy and product in the economy are left to private action, the parties to 
transactions are free to fix their own valuations. The resolution of disputes often 
requires a determination of value in the more general sense of market value, and 
such values are commonly fixed as an approximation based on a multitude of 
private valuations. But in many situations there is no reliable external standard of 
value, or the general standard is inappropriate to the precise circumstances of the 
parties. Valuation is left to private action in part because the parties are thought to 
be better able than others to evaluate the circumstances of particular transactions. 
In any event, they are not ordinarily bound to follow the valuations of others. 
Ordinarily, therefore, courts do no1 inquire into the adequacy of consideration. 
This is particularly so when one or both of the values exchanged are uncertain or 
difficult to measure. But it is also applied even when it is clear that the transaction 
is a mixture of bargain and gift. See Comment c to 5 71. Gross inadequacy of 
consideration may be relevant to issues of capacity, kaud and the like, but the 
requirement of consideration is not a safeguard against imprudent and 
improvident contracts except in cases where it appears that there is no bargain in 
fact. 
The Restatement (Second) of Contracts $ 79, Adequacy of Consideration; Mutuality of 
Obligation; "Comme This Court's Decision is consistent with the Restatement. Once 
there was no need to opine o quacy of the consideration. 
prior to signing the Note and Mortgage but that he in fact forgave Bagley. (Erickson depo. pp. 
52-55). The facts are undisputed that Bagley filed the Chapter 12 petition for Erickson and that 
he was allowed lo represent Erickson for a period of time in the Chapter 12 proceeding. The 
Defendant specifically states that he did not have any complaint with Bagley's representation in 
the Chapter 12 proceeding. (Tr. Vol. 11, p.51 L 18-21). 
D. Other Affirmative Defenses /Fraud. 
Defendant Erickson has the burden of proof on each of the affirmative defenses lo present 
facts that the Plaintifr Sirius claim for relief is subject to the defense. The entire presentation of 
Erickson focused not on the actions of Sirius but of a non-party, Bagley. Erickson has not met 
his burden. The defenses are dealt with separately as follows: 
1. ". . . the note and the mortgage uDon which the alaintiffs Comulaint are based were and 
are voidable because of unlawful acis committed in violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection 
&" Erickson's affirmative defense of a violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act 
("Act"), Idaho Code $5 48-601 et seq., are inapplicable. The Act, by its definition, applies only 
to trade or commerce withii the state of Idaho. The Act provides that "'[tirade' and 'commerce' 
mean the advertising, offering for sale, selling, leasing, renting, collecting debts arising out of the 
sale or lease of goods or services or distributing goods or services, either to or from locations 
within the state of Idaho, or directly or indirectly affecting the people of this state." I. C. $48- 
602(2). Erickson claims that a11 acts he ascribes to Bagley took place in the state of Wyoming. 
hibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of trade or commerce 
Wyoming and no part of the transactions referenced in any manner by the Defendant Erickson 
took place in the state of Idaho. 
2. ". . . plaintiffs claims are barred because Defendant acted under duress." None of the 
elements of the duress or coercion have been shown nor any proof submitted to the Court which 
would support the defense against the Plaintiff. Idaho and Wyoming law is clear. The 
Wyoming Supreme Court held: "A party must also present evidence showing that he was 
coerced by wrongful conduct. Bare allegations that these circumsta~~ces existed, without 
specifics showing their existence, are not sufficient." Pittard v Great Lakes Aviation, 156 P 3d. 
964, WYSC 05-230 - 042407 (2007). Idaho law is virtually the same and holds: Duress 
"includes that condition of mind produced by the wrongful conduct of another, rendering a 
person incompetent to contract with the exercise of his free will power." Goodman v. Lothrop, 
143 Idaho 622, 151 P.3d 818 (2006) (citing) Inland Empire Refineries v. Jones, 69 Idaho 335, 
Erickson's testimony clearly refutes that Bagley either coerced him into signing the Note 
and Mortgage or that he was under such econo~nic distress that he had no other alternatives. 
Erickson's deposition was admitted as Plaintiffs Exhibit 9. The deposition testimony clearly 
establishes that he was not coerced into entering into the transactio~l was Sirius. (Erickson depo. 
pp. 25-26, L 10-25 and 1-4). 
3. ". .. plaintiff is estooped from asserting the claims herein." Absolutely no proof was 
presented that would support the affmative defense of estoppel. 
4." ... plaintiffs claims are barred by the fiaud." Erickson's claims of fraud, as a matter 
of law, are barred in that he has failed to plead the elements of fraud with particularity. Idaho law 
defense or as a counterclaim, the circulnstances constituting fraud must be stated with 
particularity in the pleading. I.R.C.P. 9(b); Theriault v. A.H Robins Co., Inc., 108 Idaho 303, 698 
P.2d 365 (1985). The elements of fraud are: (1) a representation of fact; (2) its falsity; (3) its 
materiality; (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity; (5) the speaker's intent that the 
representation will be acted upon in a reasonably contemplated manner; (6) the listener's 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) the listener's reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) the 
listener's right to rely on the truth of the representation; and (9) the listener's consequent and 
proximate injury. Stvate v. Cambridge Telephone Co. Inc., 118 Idaho 157, 795 P.2d 319, (1990). 
Regardless of any other circumstance relating to the affirmative defenses, any reliance on fraud 
or misrepresentation was not proven by clear and convincing evidence at the time of the trial. 
5. ". . . plaintiff failed to mitigate its damages, and that any and all damages, as alleged bv 
the plaintiff, which are expressly denied, resulted from said failure to mitigate damages." 
Absolutely no proof of failure to mitigate was presented at the time of trial. 
6. " ... the note and the mortgage upon which the plaintiffs Complaint is based were and 
are invalid and therefore any action based won them is barred by invalidiQn Absolutely no 
proof was presented at the time of trial showing the invalidity of the note and mortgage. In fact, 
Erickson agreed that Sirius had proven its case as to the validity of the Note and Mortgage. 
7. "... the note and mortgage upon which plaintiffs Complaint is based were and are 
illegal and plaintiffs Comulaint is barred by said iIlegalitv." Absolutely no proof was presented 
at the time of trial showing the invalidity of the Note and Mortgage. In fact, Erickson agreed that 
Sirius had proven its case as to the validity of the Note and Mortgage. Erickson and his attorney, 
Judith Shively, during the course of the Chapter 12 proceeding, had a full and fair opportunity to 
bankruptcy court in Chapter 12 proceeding challenging the Note and Mortgage. The motion was 
dismissed and the Defendant and Shively failed to follow the bankruptcy court's order directing 
the Defendant to file an adversary proceeding. 
8. "... the Comolaint and each and everv separate cause of action contained therein is 
barred in whole or in Dart by reason of olaintifk unclean hands." Erickson failed to present any 
evidence at the time of the hearing that would support his defense of unclean hands against 
Sirius. 
9. " ... there was inadequate and insufficient consideration to support the ourported 
agreements between the parties." Ericlcson has failed to address the issues relating to 
insufficiency or inadequacy of consideration and has presented no argument or proof directed to 
this affirmative defense. The law of the case established consideration. Further, Erickson 
stipulated that Sirius had proven its case 
10." ... the agTeement may not be soecifically enforced because the assent of Defendant to 
the agreement was given under the influence of mistake, misaourehension or sururise." No proof 
was presented by Erickson that he was under the influence of mistake, misapprehension or 
surprise. In fact his testimony was to the contrary. 
11. ". . .. the Complaint and each and every seoarate cause of action contained therein 
is barred in whole or in part by the doctrine of undue influence." Absolutely no proof was 
presented by Erickson at the time of trial that the doctrine of undue influence applied or that 
Erickson signed the Note and Mortgage because of undue influence. 
Erickson claims that the affirmative defenses are supported by claims for professional 
neglige~~ce, breach of fiduciary duty, violation of the Idaho Consumer Protection Act, unjust 
properly set off against the Plaintiffs claims in this case. (P's Ex. 8). Rather than being a mere 
affirmative claim of an offset for a sum of money, the determillation of whether an offset exists 
requires the District Court to conduct a trial concerning legal representation that occurred in the 
state of Wyoming at a time when Erickson and Bagley were residents of the state of Wyoming. 
The affirmative defenses, by this process, are expanded into a full-blown third-party claim 
against Bagley, who is not a party to this action, and then somehow transforming the resolution 
of that third-party case into a setoff against Sirius. 
E. Judicial Estouuel 1 Res .Iudicata. 
Erickson and his attorney, Judith Shively, who represented Erickson in the Chapter 12 
proceeding, failed to disclose the malpractice claims against Bagley or any other claim against 
him as an asset of the bankruptcy estate. However, Shively did file a motion in the Chapter 12 
proceeding dealing with the issues surrounding Bagley's fees and the Note and Mortgage. (P's 
Ex.17). The bankruptcy judge entered an order denying the motion. (P's Ex. 18). In fact, 
Shively testified at trial that she had the expertise to file an adversary proceeding involving the 
same issues that were raised in the motion, that Bagley would have been subject to the 
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and that the issues involving the attorney fees and 
malpractice would have been considered core issues in a bankruptcy proceednlg. (Tr. Vol. 11, 
pp.220 -223) 
Erickson could have and should have challenged the order of the Bankruptcy Court and 
raised these issues in that court. Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by 
taking one position, and then seekhg a second advantage by taking an incompatible position. 
Sword v. Sweet, 140 Idaho 242,252,92 P.3d 492,502 (2004). Loomis v. Church, 76 Idaho 87, 
277 P.2d 561 (1954). Robertson Supply, Inc. v. Nicholls, 131 Idaho 99, 101, 952 P.2d 914, 916 
(Ct.App.1998). 
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals has pointed out that a debtor seelcing shelter under 
the hanlcr~~ptcy laws is required to disclose all assets, or potential assets, to the bankruptcy court 
under 11 U.S.C. $ 521(1), and 541(a)(7). Burnes v. Pemco Aeroplex, Inc., 291 F.3d 1282, 1286 
(1 lth Cir.2002). Full disclosure is '"crucial to the effective functioning of the federal bankruptcy 
system." Id. Because both creditors and bankruptcy courts rely on the accuracy of the disclosure 
statements, the Court concluded, "the importance of full and honest disclosure cannot be 
overstated." Id. 
Responding to the debtor's arguments of lack of both privity and prejudice, the Court 
noted that judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial system, not litigants, so numerous 
courts have held that "[wlhile privity and/or detrimental reliance are often present in judicial 
estoppel cases, they are not required." Id. Additionally, parties asserting judicial estoppel are not 
required to demonstrate individual prejudice since courts have concluded that the doctrine is 
intended to protect the judicial system. Id. 
While Idaho appellate courts have applied the doctrine of judicial estoppel in a nunber of 
cases, the courts have not dealt with a situation where the first proceeding from which a party 
later tales an inconsistent position in a bankruptcy proceeding. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals provides guidance in a similar case, Hamilion v. Sfate Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 
778 (9th Cir.2001). 
Hamilton brought suit against State Farm for bad faith and breach of contract after the 





had filed for bankruptcy. Id. at 781. Hamilton's bankruptcy schedules listed the vandalism loss 
against his estate but failed to list the corresponding claims against State Farm as assets of the 
estate. Id. State Farm filed a motion to dismiss I-Iamilton's claims against the insurance company 
and the motion was granted based upon the doctrine of judicial estoppel. This decision was 
affirmed on appeal. Id. at 782. 
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals cited the following rule regarding application of the 
doctrine: " In the bankruptcy context, a party is judicially estopped from asserting a cause of 
action not raised in a reorganization plan or otherwise mentioned in the debtor's schedules or 
disclosure statements." Hay v First Interstate Bank of Kalispell, NA., 978 F.2d 555, 557 (9th 
Cir.1992) (failure to give notice of a potential cause of action in bankruptcy schedules and 
Disclosure Statements estops the debtor from prosecuting that cause of action); In re Coastal 
Plains, 179 F.3d 197, 208 (5th Cir.1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1117, 120 S.Ct. 936, 145 
L.Ed.2d 814 (2000) (holding that a debtor is barred from bringing claims not disclosed in its 
bankruptcy schedules); Payless Wholesale Distributors, Inc. v. Alberto Culver (P.R.) Inc., 989 
F.2d 570, 572 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 931, 114 S.Ct. 344, 126 L.Ed.2d 309 (1993) 
(debtor who obtained relief on the representation that no claims existed cannot resurrect such 
claims and obtain relief on the opposite basis); Oneida Motor Freight, Inc. v United Jersey 
Bank, 848 F.2d 414, 419 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 967, 109 S.Ct. 495, 102 L.Ed.2d 532 
(1988) (debtor's failure to list potential claims against a creditor 'worked in opposition to 
preservation of the integrity of the system which the doctrine of judicial estoppel seeks to 
protect,' and debtor is estopped by reason of such failure to disclose). A&J ConstPuction Co., 
Inc, v. Wood, at 141 Idaho 682,116 P.3d 12 (2005). 
The claim is also precluded by the doctrine of res judicata. "[A] valid and final judgment 
rendered in an action extinguishes all claims arising out of the same transaction or series of 
transactions out of which the cause of action arose." Diamond v. Farmers Group, Inc., 11  9 Idaho 
146, 150, 804 P.2d 319, 323 (1990). In addition, in an action between the same parties upon the 
same claim or demand, the former adjudication concludes parties and privies not only as to every 
matter offered and received to sustain or defeat the claim but also as to every matter which might 
and should have been litigated in the first suit. C Systems, Inc. v. McGee, 145 Idaho 559, 181 
P.3d 485 (2008) . The unchallenged order denying Erickson's motion challenging the validity of 
the Note and Mortgage became final. 
The malpractice claim arises from Bagley's representation of Erickson in the Wyoming 
Bankruptcy Court. Defendant Erickson's malpractice claim is barred by the doctrine of res 
judicaia in that the malpractice claim should have been brought in the bankruptcy action as part 
of an adversary proceeding challenging the Note and Mortgage which are the subject matter of 
this action. An adversary proceeding brought by a debtor to asserl a malpractice claim against his 
bankruptcy lawyer is a case that falls within a bankruptcy court's core jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. $ 157. See In re Southmark, 163 F.3d 925, 930-32 (5th Cir. 1999)(emphasis added). 
Erickson's motion in the bmkmptcy proceeding challenging the Note and Mortgage as being 
either a preference or prepetition attorney fees in the Chapter 11 proceeding. The issue of 
malpractice or issues relating to the attorney fees of Bagley or other defenses to the Note and 
Mortgage should have been raised in the bankruptcy. Grausz v. Englander, 321 F.3d 467, (2003) 
holding: ("This is a professional malpractice action filed by a Chapter 11 debtor against the law 
fm that represented him in his bankruptcy case. We hold that the district c o w  had bankruptcy 
bankruptcy case. In addition, we affirm the district court's award of summary judgment to the 
law firm because the malpractice claim is barred on res judicata grounds by an earlier order of 
the bankruptcy court"). 
Therefore any affirmative defense based upon the claim of professional malpractice 
on the part of Bagley or any defenses to the Promissory Note and Mortgage are barred by the 
doctrine of res judicata. The issues were within the core jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court and 
the action should have been prosecuted by the Defendant in the bankruptcy proceeding. As a 
matter of law, any affirmative defense that should have been brought in the bankruptcy action is 
barred as a defense in this proceeding. 
Erickson challenges the reasonableness of Bagley's attorney fees in the handling of the 
Chapter 11 proceeding. However, by way stipulation at the beginning of the trial, Erickson 
agreed that the numbers and calculations in the Note were correct. Erickson testified that llis 
Marital Settlement Agreement with his former wife provided that he would pay the attorney fees 
to Mr. Bagley. Erickson was represented by an independent attorney during the divorce 
proceeding and he admits that he reviewed the settlement with that attorney. 
The agreement specifically states: "Each party asserts that he or she has made a fhll and 
fair disclosure of all of the property of any nature whatsoever belonging in any way to each of 
them, and of dl debts and encumbrances incurred in any manner whatsoever by each of them. 
Such disclosures are part of the consideration made by each party for entering into this 
agreement." 
At the time of trial, Erickson testified to the effect that he was unaware that he was 
paying all of the fees charged by Bagley for his representation of Erickson's wife. Based upon 
knew that he was receiving a benefit from agreeing to pay all of the attorney fees to Bagley 
through the Divorce Settlement. Erickson now claims those fees are unreasonable after he 
received the benefit oftheir value. 
The Federal Bankruptcy Judge recognized in its order dated June 6, 2000, that: "The 
divorce of the Erickson's may impact the extent to which the claim is valid against the estate." 
Mr. Bagley testified at the hearing that he fdly disclosed the amount of his fees, including an 
accounting of the $5,000.00 payment, to the Defendant in his ofgce in Wyoming and they both 
agreed that the amount was correct. Erickson does not dispute those assertions. Bagley also 
testified that his legal representation allowed the time necessary to complete the ultimate goal of 
the chapter 12 and Chapter 11 proceedings, i.e. time to sell the real property. 
The trustee, in its report to the Chapter 12 Bankruptcy Court, confirmed that at least three 
years were necessary to market and sell the property based upon the circumstances surrounding 
the sale.(P1s Ex. 19). Even if the issue of the reasonableness of Bagley's attorney fees in the 
Chapter 11 proceedings is relevant to this action under the circumstances, it is clear that they 
were in fact reasonable and not out of line with the comparable charges made by Ms. Shively for 
her limited representation in the Chapter 12. (P's Ex. 26,)(Tr. Vol. I, p. 218, L 19-25, p. 219, 1- 
8). 
F. Expert Witness Testimony. 
1. Erickson's Witness. 
Erickson's expert witness, Judith Shively, is one of Erickson's attorneys. She represented 
him in the Chapter 12 proceeding. Shively is an interested person in the outcome of this 
litigation. Ms. Shively, among other things, consciously chose not to pursue resolution of the 
issues relating to Bagley's fees, the Mortgage, the claims of setoff, conflict, unreasonablei~ess of 
fees and malpractice against Bagley in the bankruptcy proceeding. In fact, many of the claims 
were not disclosed to the bankruptcy court. The bankruptcy court ordered Erickson to file an 
"adversary proceeding" in order to challenge the Mortgage. Shively's decisions prevented the 
proper determinations from being made in the bankruptcy proceeding. 
Ms. Shively's fees for handling three minor amendments of the Chapter 12 plan exceeded 
$24,000. (P's Ex. 26). She then advised Erickson in her capacity as his anorney on how to 
respond to the complaint in this action. She also directly contacted Sirius' attorney and sought 
an extension of time to respond. During this time, all of the issues and facts which form the basis 
of the affirmative defenses could have been litigated in the bankruptcy court. All of the 
necessary parties were within the jurisdiction of the Wyoming Bankruptcy Court. I-Ier actions 
resulted in a substantial amount of attorney fees ($24,000 and climbing) being expended in state 
court litigation on issues that should have been resolved in the federal bankruptcy court. 
"Bias is a term used in the 'common law of evidence' to describe the relationship 
between a party and a witness which might lead the witness to slant, unconsciously or otherwise, 
his testimony in favor of or against a party. Bias may be induced by a witness' like, dislike, or 
fear of a party, or by the witness' self-interest. Proof of bias is almost always relevant because the 
jury [or, in this case, the trial judge], as finder of fact and weigher of credibility, has historically 
been entitled to assess all evidence which might bear on the accuracy and truth of a witness' 
testimony." United States v. Greenwood, 796 F.2d 49 (4th Cir.1986). 
Shively collected fees in excess of $24,000 in the Chapter 12 bankruptcy. (P's Ex. 26). 
Without any explanation of the reason, Shively filed three amended plans in order to successfully 
Erickson, that being to allow time to sell a portion of the property and pay all of the creditors. 
Between Shively and Ericltson's attorneys in Idaho, large sums have been spent to resolve an 
issue that could have been more efficiently handled in the bankruptcy action. 
The expert witnesses' testimony is biased and she advocates as an attorney on the part of 
the Defendant. Shively clearly has a conflict of interest in fulfilling her role as a zealous 
advocate and providing court with an unbiased "expert" opinion as contemplated by the Idaho 
rules of evidence. Shively's trial testimony established that she did not have the expertise to 
determine damages. (Tr. Voi. I. p. 39 L 12-21). The District Court allowed Shively to testify that 
some of Erickson's creditors were awarded attorney fees, however there was no foundation 
showing why those fees were attributable to any act of Sirius or that the fees would not have 
been incurred in any event. 
2. Waiver of Objection to Baglev's Testimony. 
Erickson's attorney took the deposition of Willianl Bagley on April 25,2008. During the 
deposition, inquiry was made concerning the expert opinions of Bagley. The questions were 
directed at specific actions taken during Bagley's representation of Erickson in the Chapter I I 
proceeding in Wyoming. The inquiry also elicited Bagley's opinions relating to the "standard of 
care" in his representation of Erickson and the reasonableness of the fees charged by Bagley. 
(Bagley depo. p.67, 111, 113, 114, 159) Erickson's attorney and expert witness, Shively, was 
present at Bagley's deposition. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 70 L 7-17). The deposition of Bagley in its entirety 
was introduced as an exhibit at trial during Erickson's case in chief. Ericlcson relied heavily upon 
the deposition testimony at the time of trial. Erickson objected prior to allowing Bagley to testify 
as an expert claiming that he had not been disclosed by Sirius as an expert in that he had been 
Erickson cannot dispute that he had a full opportunity to discover Bagley's opinions. Erickson 
cannot dispute that he used Bagley's opinions as a part of his case and there is no basis to restrict 
Bagley's testimony in response to the evidence presented at the time of trial by Erickson. Clearly, 
Erickson has waived any objection to the testimony of Bagley relating to his opinions, and at the 
time trial. 
G. Conflict of Interest. 
Rule 1.8 of the Rules of Professional Conduct is the same for the states of Idaho and 
Wyoming. The Rule was not violated by Bagley. Furthermore, Sirius is not subject to the 
assertion that violation of an ethics rule by an outside party somehow voids the Note and 
Mortgage. During the transaction in question, the Defendant was represented by an independent 
attorney who reviewed the fee charged by Bagley and included a provision for its payment as a 
secured debt in the Divorce Settlement. (Plaintiffs Exhibit "3")(Tr. Vol. I, p. 42 L 11-25 p. 1-25) 
Comment 4 to Rule 1.8 is conclusive on the issue. It states: 
[4] If the client is independently represented in the transaction, paragraph (a)(2) of 
this Rule is inapplicable, and the paragraph (a)(l) requirement for full disclosure 
is satisfied either by a written disclosure by the lawyer involved in the transaction 
or by the client's independent counsel. The fact that the client was independently 
represented in the transaction is relevant in determining whether the agreement 
was fair and reasonable to the client as paragraph (a)(l) further requires. 
I.R.P.C. Rule 1.8, Comment 4. 
The trial judge determined that Erickson was represented by an independent attorney and 
that he had reviewed with that attorney the fact that the debt involving attorney fees would be 
secured. (Tr. Vol. 11, 45 L 7-15). Erickson also testified that he had a full understanding of the 
Note and Mortgage. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 51 L 1-16). 
The District Court found that Erickson did not file an action against Bagley in the 
bankruptcy court, the state courts of Wyoming, a claim in the Idaho proceeding or file a 
complaint against Bagley with the Wyoming Bar Association. The Defendant testified that he 
had no complaint with Mr. Bagley's representation of him in the Chapter 12 proceeding. (Tr. 
Vol. 11, p. 51 L 18-21). The filing of the Chapter 12 proceeding is the consideration for the Note 
relied upon by the Idaho Supreme Court in Sirius. The "law of the case" doctrine establishes that 
) 
what happened prior to that time regarding Mr. Bagley's representation of the Defendant in the 
Chapter 11 proceeding is not the relevant inquiry. The only relevant issue relates to filing the 
Chapter 12, a fact that was determined to have occurred by this Court. Sirius v Erickson, 144 
Idaho 38, 156 P.3d 539,62 UCC Rep.Serv.2d 41 1 (2007). 
Defendant claims that Bagley should not collect attorney fees because of a number of 
conflicts of interest he claims arose during the course of representation. Defendant claims that a 
conflict of interest arose when Mr. Bagley undertook the representation of Defendant's former 
spouse Kathleen Erickson in a companion Chapter 11 case. The purpose of filing Kathleen's 
bankruptcy was not materially adverse to either of those individuals. Defendant and his wife 
were both represented by separate attorneys who referred them to Mr. Bagley for the purpose of 
filing the Chapter 11 cases. The representation provided by Mr. Bagley was exactly what the 
Defendant had requested to stop the foreclosures that were facing the Erickson's. The ultimate 
goal both of the Ericlcsons sought was to sell a sufficient amount of property to pay off their 
debts, realizing that there was significant equity in the property to allow a plan to work. 
Erickson and his wife were in the process of divorce and their interests were resolved by 
the Divorce Settlement. The Divorce Settlement specifically referred to the fees owed to MI. 
Defendant agreed in his testimony that the issue of the attorney fees was part of what was 
reviewed by his independent attorney. Defendant also acknowledged that he understood that all 
of the information regarding debts was to be disclosed in the Divorce Settlement. Erickson 
claimed that Bagley's representation of his wife in the Chapter 11 proceedings created such a 
conflict that he could not continue with Erickson's representation. The rules of professional 
conduct apply to circumstances where the attorneys ability to represent the client is materially 
adverse to the interests of the client. The comment applicable to the rule states: "A conflict of 
interest exists if there is a significant risk that the lawyer's ability to consider, recommend or 
cany out an appropriate course of action for the client will be materially limited as a result of the 
lawyer's other responsibilities or interests. For example, a lawyer asked to represent several 
individuals seeking to form a joint venture is likely to be materially limited in the lawyer's ability 
to recommeild or advocate all possible positions that each might take because of the lawyer's 
duty of loyalty to the others. The conflict in effect forecloses alternatives that would otherwise be 
available to the client." Rule 1.7 Wyoming Rules of Professional Conduct comment [8]. 
The Wyoming Supreme Court dealt with the issue of defining what amounts to a conflict 
of interest. The Wyoming Court focused on the concept of whether or not the claimed conflict 
would be "materially adverse". In the case of Simpson Performance Products, Inc. v. Horn, 92 
P.3d 283, 2004 WY 69 (Wyo. 2004) that Court held: "However, the question of whether 
representation is "materially adverse" to a former client becomes less clear in situations like the 
present, where the former client, although not directly involved in the litigation, may be affected 
by it in some manner. Under these circumstances, we must make a case-specific inquiry to 
determine the degree to which the current representation may actually be harmful to the former 
client. (citation omitted) "This fact-intensive analysis focuses on whether the current 
representation may cause legal, financial, or other identifiable detriment to the former client. 
(citation omitted) Additionally, we must determine "whether the attorney's exercise of individual 
loyalty to one client might hann the other client or whether his zealous representation will induce 
him to use confidential information that could adversely affect the former client." 
William B. Bagley's representation was not materially adverse to the Defendant at any 
time during his prosecution of the Chapter 11 proceedings or in his negotiations with creditors 
after the Chapter 1 I had been dismissed. Mr. Bagley's representation of the Defendant in the 
Chapter 12 proceeding was equally not materially adverse to the Defendant. Defendant testified 
that he was satisfied with Mr. Bagley's representation of him in a Chapter 12 proceeding. He 
agreed to and acknowledged in writing Mr. Bagley's representation after Mr. Bagley had 
disclosed in writing the adverse interest. (Tr. Vol. 11, p. 50, L 6-10). 
N. ATTORNEY FEES. 
I. Costs and Fees Awarded by the District Court. 
The District Court in a judgment on September 30, 2008, awarding among other things 
cost and attorney fees to Sirius. Pursuant to the provisions of I.R.C. P. 54(d)(5), Sirius filed a 
Memorandum of Cost and Fees within 14 days after the judgment was entered. Erickson did not 
file a11 objectioil to the Memorandum of Costs and Fees. The failure to file the objection 
constituted a waiver of all objections to the costs and fees. I.R.C. P. 54 (d)(6); Great Plains 
Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 136 Idaho 466,36 P.3d 218 Idaho (2001). Erickson 
agreed that the fees and costs were reasonable and the District Court entered its Order 
Determining Attorney Fees on December 5, 2008. Erickson has waived any objection to the 
award. Sirius is the prevailing party. In addition, the Note and the Mortgage provide that 
Erickson "agrees to pay all expenses of collection including a reasonable attorney's fee". (P's Ex. 
1 and 2). I. C. 512-120 (3) provides for the award of attorney fees involving transactions. 
2. Costs and Fees on Apgeal. 
Sirius based upon the agreement contained in the Note and Nortgage and the provisions 
of I.A.R. 4land Idaho Code 512-120(3) is entitled to an award of attorney fees on appeal. 
V. CONCLUSION. 
The District Court's findings relating to Sirius's case are supported by substantial 
evidence. Erickson agreed that Sirius had proven its claim and that the amount claimed in the 
Promissory Note was correct. The District Court's conclusions of law are supported by 
substantial evidence in the case. The claims raised by Erickson against Bagley were not proven 
to be effective defenses against the claims of Sirius. The de facto third-party claim against 
Bagley fails due to lack of jurisdiction of the court to try the mafler of Bagley's misconduct, res 
judicata based upon the Order of the Bankruptcy Court and the doctrine of judicial estoppel. The 
doctrine of the law of the case prevents Erickson from litigating the issue surrounding 
consideration for the Note and Mortgage. The same doctrine precludes Erickson ffom 
challenging the amount of the Promissory Note. 
Erickson had a Eull opportunity to discover all of the knowledge and opinions held by 
William Bagley relating to his legal representation of Erickson in the federal bankruptcy court. 
The deposition testimony of Bagley was submitted to the trial court as a part of Erickson's case. 
That testimony was considered by the trial court. Erickson's presentation of the deposition 
testimony as evidence results in a waiver of any objection to Bagley testifying as an expert at the 
time of trial. The District Court did not commit a reversible error by allowing the testimony. The 
District Court was also within its discretion in giving less weight to the expert called by 
Erickson. The expert was an attorney representing Erickson and also responsible for not pursuing 
Erickson's claims against Bagley regarding his legal representation in the federal bankruptcy 
court in Wyoming. 
Based upon the terms of the Note and Mortgage, I.A.R. 41 and the provisioils of Idaho 
Code $12-120(3), Sirius is entitled to an award of attorney fecs.Sirius respectfully requests that 
this Court affirm the decision of the District Court. 
Dated thispday of December 2009. 
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